SLINK: SIMPLE, EFFECTIVE FILESYSTEM MAINTENANCE ABSTRACTIONS FOR COMMUNITYBASED ADMINISTRATION

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Arena

- O Academic heterogeneous UNIX environment (6 platforms, 100 stations, 1000 users).
- O Shortage of administrative budget and staff.
- Many students and faculty willing to help.
- Problem: provide the most current versions of hundreds of software packages, from freeware to commercial production systems.
- O While minimizing:
 - administrator training needs.
 - threats to the user environment.
 - security problems.

Lessons Learned

0	Effective administration is the result of a careful		
	interplay between tools and policy.		
0	Tools that enforce policy are a waste of time.		
0	We rely instead on tools that reinforce policy:		
	☐ the tool can do anything, any way, but:		
	it's easier to comply with policy than to dissent		
0	Two examples:		
	☐ Thou shalt install thy software package with		
	parallel structure to that of /usr/local (bin,lib,)		
	☐ Thou shalt not modify vendor-supplied		
	filesystems inappropriately.		

SLINK: Some Effective Abstractions

- O link <source> <destination> make an image of the contents of <source> within <destination>, using symbolic links.
- O unlink <source> <destination> undo the effects of a previous link command, by removing links that point to files in the <source>.
- O copy <source> <destination> make a copy of <source> within <destination>
- O uncopy <source> <destination> undo a previous copy, erasing only files that exactly match files in the <source>.

SLINK's Features

- System status is documented in a configuration file that lists all SLINK commands in effect.
- O Commands are **assertions** about what filesystem directories should contain.
- O Commands modify filesystems **incrementally**, making changes only when necessary...
- O while users are utilizing the system(!).
- Operations are **reversible** (provided copy sources are available).
- Operations are useful regardless of system scale.

Compliant and Non-compliant Software Installation

O Compliant: software placed in parallel trees.

```
cd /loc/lang/perl5.003 /local
```

link bin bin

link lib lib

link man man

O Non-compliant: software not installed in parallel trees:

```
cd /loc/publish/frame-5 /local
link bin/maker bin/maker
link bin/fminit bin/fminit
...<20 more lines>...
```

Reinforcing Policy

- O freeze <path>: do not change anything in <path>
 (e.g. a vendor-supplied filesystem)
- O protect <path>: allow additions, but no changes or deletions of existing elements in <path>.
- O relink <path>: like protect, but allow changes and deletions of symbolic links in <path>.
- O **redirect** <*path*>: like **relink**, but allow the deletion of empty directories, and the conversion of directories of links to single links where possible.
- O replace <path>: allow any change in <path>.

Protecting Data from SLINK

```
freeze /
redirect /local
relink /local/X11
freeze /local/man/cat*
freeze /local/lib/emacs/lib/locks
```

- O /usr/bin has policy freeze, inherited from /.
- O /local/bin has policy redirect, inherited from /local.
- O Administrators with privilege can still modify these locations, but **SLINK will not**, unless the requestor specifically overrides policy with new directives.

SLINK's Philosophy

 Miminalist approach 		
		as few commands as possible
		as few protection modes as possible
		as little to learn as possible
		as few capabilities as possible
O Can-do attitude:		
		can violate policy, but it'll be more difficult.
		avoid frustration, at the expense of some non-
		compliance.
		provide tools that clean up after non-compliant
		acts (with a fascist policy on cleanup).

Problems

0	SLINK cannot distribute files.		
		we rely upon NFS to make files available.	
		NFS files can be copied and uncopied to create	
		local disk images.	
	QI	INK cannot protect against problems inherent in	

- SLINK cannot protect against problems inherent in the community-based administration model:
 - decreased security due to less ability to monitor administrative acts.
 - ☐ disruption of user services due to administrative mistakes (SLINK can **repair** the mistakes, but cannot **prevent** them).

Example: environment variables.

- O File-based scheme: if a package requires environment variables, place appropriate commands into /local/env/<package>.<shell> which gets sourced upon user login.
- O Example: /local/env/frame.cshrc
- This is a threat both to user environment integrity and to system security. Volunteer administrators:
 - can make mistakes that keep users from logging on.
 - can arrange for every user to execute an arbitrary shell script of their choosing!

Conclusions

- O Policy must decide the relative importance of:
 - 1. installing current software versions
 - 2. support for heterogeneous platforms and software base
 - 3. installer training time and morale
 - 4. system integrity, security, and consistency
- SLINK provides the proper services for us because of how we weight these desires.
- SLINK does not sufficiently address security and integrity issues when used by multiple, less-skilled administrators.

Further Work

- Slink's Perl-5 library of functions makes SLINK's assertions available to developers of maintenance applications.
- O SLINK will not support remote file distribution, but our package DISTR will fulfill that purpose for us.

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